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Nicholas Mesnager was an expert on trade in the Spanish colonies. For that reason
the Controller General, Michel Chamillart, sent him to Spain to negotiate for French access
to the Spanish colonial trade. Likewise the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Colbert
de Torcy, used Mesnager to negotiate commercial understandings with the United
Provinces and with Britain for the purpose of arriving at an agreement on preliminaries to a
peace conference. Finally, Louis XIV appointed Mesnager as one of the three French
Plenipotentiaries to negotiate a general peace at Utrecht.
Mesnager was born in Rouen in May of 1658. He worked as a merchant in
international trade and in 1700 was elected by the Rouen Chamber of Commerce to
represent Rouen in the Council of Commerce newly revived by Louis XIV. Within the
Council of Commerce he worked between 1701 and 1703 with Annisson and Peletyer to
reform the Tariff of 1664. He also worked with Annisson and Fenellon in support of an
internal customs union, that is, a set of uniform customs duties for all goods crossing
French borders and the elimination of internal customs. In 1703 he set forth his economic
ideas in a memoir. He deplored France's negative balance of trade. Although French
merchants trading through Cadiz acquired much in gold and silver, these metals never
reached France because they were used to buy Dutch and English goods. He proposed a
simplified customs and he viewed state trading companies as unproductive but sometimes
necessary. In short, he was a follower of Jean-Baptiste Colbert in his economic thinking.
Prior to coming to Paris in 1700 to sit on the Council of Commerce, Mesnager had
formed an acquaintance with Chamillart who was the intendant at Rouen in the 1690s. In
December 1704 Chamillart sent Mesnager to Madrid to represent him on the Council of
the Indies. D'Aubenton was already on this Council representing the French Secretary of
the Navy, Jerome Pontchartrain. Mesnager's mission was to obtain the right for French
merchants to trade directly with the Spanish colonies and to circumvent the illegal trade
being carried by the Dutch and English. Neither Pontchartrain nor D'Aubenton were
particularly in favor of this goal. In 1706 Mesnager presented to the Spanish Council of
Commerce a plan of 17 articles representing his ideas for a new organization for American
commerce. One point in his plan was to have French ships be a part of the Spanish fleet
which departed from Cadiz at regular intervals. His key ideas, however, were stated in
such a way that those nations which were "allied" with Spain would have freer access to
the Spanish colonial trade. France was, of course, "allied" with Spain, but this also
allowed the interpretation that other maritime nations which were not at war with Spain
could also benefit from this new organization of American commerce. His ideas were put
aside by the Spanish and he was recalled to Paris in April 1706.
From Mesnager's point of view the War of the Spanish Succession was about trade
in the Spanish colonies. The dynastic politics of the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons were
secondary issues. If Spain would agree to a plan giving direct access to its colonial
markets for all maritime nations, Mesnager believed that the Dutch could be persuaded to
withdraw from the war and a peace settlement would follow. The Dutch were very
suspicious of the French bargaining in Madrid which had been in process for the last
several years. Following the logic of Mesnager's argument, Torcy sent him to the United

Provinces in December 1707 to allay Dutch fears and to elaborate how nations "allied"
with Spain might participate in their trade. In Rotterdam he met with Van Der Dussen and
read to him his Nouveau systeme de commerce et de navigation d'Espagne. He also
proposed a return to the tariffs of 1664 with modifications. Later he elaborated the same
ideas with Heinsius and Baron Duvenvoirde. The center piece of his proposal was that
Cadiz would become the entrepot for all trade with Spanish America and all nations could
freely trade their goods through Cadiz. Also Cadiz would remain neutral. The Dutch liked
his proposals, but they also demanded the replacement of Philip V and a discussion of the
Barrier Treaties. Unwilling to discuss these issues as part of a preliminary agreement,
Torcy had Mesnager return to Paris in March 1708.
Although Mesnager's negotiation with the Dutch had produced no dividends, he
was still optimistic that a concrete plan for the Spanish trade would detach the Dutch from
the war. Two months after returning from The Hague, he was again in Madrid, this time
sent by Torcy. In the next round of negotiations with the Spanish he ignored Pontchartrain
and D'Aubenton. On 7 July 1708 a plan, which was no doubt the work of Mesnager, was
placed before the Spanish Despacho where it was favorably received. The plan proposed
to make Cadiz the entrepot for American trade. All cargo was to be carried in Spanish
ships, but merchants of all nations "allied" with Spain could trade through Cadiz without
the mediation of Spanish merchants. If approved, Mesnager hoped his plan would become
the preliminary for a peace conference. Instead, Louis XIV chose to use the plan as a
bargaining point at a future peace conference. Mesnager returned to Paris in July. In 1709
Torcy sent him to negotiate with the Dutch, but they refused him a passport.
The initiative to settle commercial issues as a preliminary to a general peace came
not from the Dutch but form the English. When the Tories assumed control of the
government in 1710, their goal was to conclude a peace with France. They were willing to
concede Philip's right to the Spanish throne and hoped to drag from its Allies agreement on
this point. Although Oxford negotiated secretly with the French from late 1710 to April
1711, it was with the idea that the Allies would be included in the final agreement for a
peace conference. After June 1711, however, he dropped the intent of including them. He
was bent on creating a South Sea Company to fund unsecured government debt. For this
he needed monopolistic concessions in the Spanish colonies, which he was certain the
Dutch would not agree to. To obtain these new concessions he sent Matthew Prior to Paris
in July 1711. When Prior arrived in Paris his instructions from Oxford included a request
not only for general concessions for all the Allies, but also a list of concessions for Britain
alone. These latter requests stated that France should recognize the House of Hanover, that
France concede Newfoundland and Hudson Bay to Britain, and that Spain give Britain
Gibraltar, Port Mahon, and a treaty for the slave trade or Assiento. In addition Prior made
a verbal demand that Spain cede at least four towns in the West Indies to be named at a
later date by Britain. Torcy submitted these demands to Mesnager and La Lande Magon.
Mesnager declared them to be unacceptable. Torcy too found the British proposals to be
extreme, but he felt there was basis for negotiations. He therefore sent Mesnager to
London with Prior to work out differences with the British cabinet.
Torcy had given Mesnager some leeway to negotiate, but he was not to concede
territory for Spain. When Mesnager met with Oxford and Shrewsbury on 15 August 1711,
Mesnager was told that the territorial concessions were necessary for a peace. Five days

later, however, Oxford dropped his demand for the four towns and told Mesnager that
Britain would accept in their place an extension of the Assiento Treaty from 10 to 30 years.
Mesnager worked through September on the other points in Oxford's demands. After some
bargaining, the English agreed to allow French fishermen to dry their catches on the
Newfoundland beaches, and the French agreed to dismantle the Port of Dunkirk and to
explicitly recognize the Protestant succession in Britain. On 27 September 1711 Mesnager
signed for France three agreements. The first agreement was a secret treaty listing French
and Spanish concessions to Britain. These were the issues which Mesnager had come to
settle and for which his expertise was needed. The second agreement stated the
preliminary terms for a peace conference. The third was a concession of land in Italy for
the Duke of Savoy. The preliminaries were sent to the allies as a fait accompli. Although
quite angry over Britains unilateral actions, the Allies agreed to a peace Congress to be
held at Utrecht beginning in January 1712.
In December 1711 Louis XIV appointed the Marechal d'Huxelles, the Abbe de
Polignac, and Nicolas Mesnager to be Plenipotentiaries for France at Utrecht. The
negotiations began in January 1711. On 11 April 1713 d'Huxelles and Mesnager signed
seven treaties which concluded the war with all parties but Austria. Peace treaties were
signed with Britain, the United Provinces, Portugal, Savoy, and Prussia. Commercial
treaties were signed with Britain and the United Provinces. The major issues of the peace
were settled in Paris and London, yet the work of the Plenipotentiaries did affect the final
outcome. In a memoir written several years earlier, Mesnager had observed that the
French had faired badly on commercial matters in the congresses at Nijmwegen and
Ryswick because no one with sufficient commercial expertise was a part of the
negotiations. Mesnager was no doubt appointed Plenipotentiary because of his extensive
commercial expertise. In addition to this, however, it was recognized that he had been
involved with negotiations from the earliest periods. Having concluded the London
Agreement with the English, he believed in the good faith of the English to secretly help
the French in its settlements with the Allies. Versailles viewed Mesnager's presence at
Utrecht as a means to hold the English to their pledges of assistance.
Before leaving for Utrecht, the Plenipotentiaries were given lengthy instructions
and were reminded not to deviate from those instructions without approval. The essence of
Mesnager's instructions concerned territorial and commercial concessions to Britain and
the Tariff of 1664. He was instructed to allow the British to have Gibraltar but not Port
Mahon except in extreme urgency or in exchange for other territories. The British were to
be given free entry into Spanish ports rather than entry into ports in the Spanish colonies or
possession of towns in the Indies. Because of the very technical nature of the commercial
negotiations, Mesnager had more room to maneuver and to take the initiative than did the
other Plenipotentiaries. Even so, the Controller General, Nicolas Desmaretz, had to
restrain Mesnager's initiatives at times. Desmaretz and the Council of Commerce worked
to supply Mesnager with information on tariffs and advice on issues. Pontchartrain, on the
other hand, complained that Mesnager did not keep him posted on the progress at Utrecht.
At times Pontchartrain offered advice which was at variance to that coming from
Desmaretz and the Council of Commerce.
Returning from a walk in the Tuilleries, Mesnager became suddenly ill and died 15
June 1714. He was buried in Saint Roch. For his service to France and Spain he had

received an annual pension of 10,000 livres from both Louis XIV and Philip V. He had
purchased the charge of secretaire du Roi and had been awarded the titles of Chevalier de
Saint-Michel and Comte de Saint-Jean. His estate was valued at 600,000 livres. He had
been one of the many donneurs d'avis who addressed the state of Louis XIV in its latter
years with proposals. He was not a theoretical economist, but his ideas, derived from
experience, did exhibit a consistency and coherence. While he accepted the protectionist
practices of Colbert as necessary for the strength of the state, he was also moving toward
greater economic liberalism. The interference of the state was inimical to commerce but
was sometimes necessary. Being both a merchant and a negotiator, he bespoke a view of
the world that balanced economic freedom and political power.
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